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Detection of counterfeit silicon 
ABSTRACT 
It is important for manufacturers of silicon chips to guard against counterfeit chips, 
hardware trojans, exploits, royalty-avoiding mechanisms, and other malicious hardware injected 
into a production stream. The techniques of this disclosure create individualized chip signatures 
during the manufacturing process. The signatures can be used to detect counterfeit silicon or 
otherwise suspicious on-board componentry. 
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BACKGROUND 
It is important for manufacturers of silicon chips to guard against counterfeit chips, 
hardware trojans, exploits, royalty-avoiding mechanisms, and other malicious hardware injected 
into a production stream. Secure manufacturing is of special concern for applications such as 
secure microprocessors, secure storage, etc. When the manufacture of integrated circuits is 
secured, it also boosts customer confidence.  
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Secure manufacturing generally seeks to guarantee that no backdoors are left open in the 
hardware that can be exploited by malicious parties. Further, secure manufacturing includes 
registration and certification of chip identities, e.g., chip-unique public keys, provision of shared 
app-layer secrets, e.g., batch keys, etc.  
One current technique of unique chip identification is the integration of physically 
unclonable functions (PUF). PUFs are identifiers on chips that result from manufacturing process 
variation. An example of a PUF is the SRAM fingerprint. On-chip PUFs have several 
deficiencies. Such PUFs require expensive normalizing hardware to generate consistent 
inferences or hashes.  
This can be a significant additional expense. Further, it is possible that an attacker can 
potentially forge a hash. Normalizing algorithms used by on-chip PUFs are lossy. Hardware 
based PUFs are static. If raw physically unclonable data is collected at the time of attestation, 
off-line analysis, e.g., using cloud-based machine learning, can spot unexpected differences 
between silicon dies. 
Without creating a per-device unique physical environment (magnetic field, power 
supply), attackers can intercept genuine silicon, or even buy off-the-shelf parts, and gather 








Fig. 1: Silicon attestation 
 Fig. 1 illustrates silicon attestation, per techniques of this disclosure. During the 
manufacturing process, e.g., near the final system-level test stage and prior to its release to 
customers, a chip (104) is placed into an attestation station (102). For example, the chip may be 
hardware that has a small SRAM footprint, e.g., a low power, secure microcontroller that can be 
used as a security key, or to sign certificates, etc. Further, such hardware may be a trusted 
platform module in a mobile device, such as a smartphone, tablet or laptop computer. Such 
hardware can also include secure storage devices. The hardware provides a hardware root of 
trust, and enables features such as verified boot.  
The station subjects the chip to a dynamic environment (106), e.g., collects multiple 
SRAM snapshots using a different voltage for each snapshot. It can also vary the voltage during 
an SRAM scan iteration. This enables the collection of multiple datasets from hardware with 
relatively small SRAM footprints. Each attestation station can be programmed with some 
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entropy, e.g., in a pseudo-random manner. For example, an attestation station may use a unique, 
randomly-generated voltage step pattern, making it difficult to fabricate data without access to 
the specific attestation station. 
The dataset generated by an attestation station is unique to the chip and its design (108). 
The dataset is used in a training phase (110) for a backend machine learning model (112) that 
generates trained ML models (114). The trained ML models are correlation models per silicon 
design and wafer. Data from chips in the same family, e.g., chips of the same silicon design, 
wafer, etc., are used in the training phase (110) to generate the machine learning models. Data 
fingerprints can be used to verify a chip for authenticity. The machine learning model accounts 
for the association of a dataset with a particular attestation station, enabling the detection of a 
mismatch during the verification process. 
 The techniques of this disclosure collect multiple raw datasets in non-lossy form. The 
relative abundance of data enables continuous improvement in characterizing silicon and 
detection algorithms. Further, the per-chip cost is lower than off the shelf PUF IP that can cost 
several dollars per chip. 
CONCLUSION 
The techniques of this disclosure create individualized chip signatures during the 
manufacturing process. The signatures can be used to detect counterfeit silicon or otherwise 
suspicious on-board componentry. 
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